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Southeast Asia Between China  
and the United States
Munir Majid
The new geopolitics of Southeast Asia is dominated by the emerging regional rivalry between China and the United States. The contest has been highlighted by incidents in the South 
China Sea where the US has made clear its interest in ensuring freedom of navigation and in 
the peaceful settlement of China’s disputes with smaller regional states. Some in the Pentagon 
project an ‘AirSea Battle’ in the region similar to the ‘AirLand Battle’ planned during the Cold 
War – a scenario given credence by US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta’s announcement at 
the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2012 of an American naval force ‘rebalancing’ in the Pacific 
from the current 50 percent to 60 percent by 2020. More widely, historian Arne Westad describes 
Southeast Asia as ‘The decisive territory, on the future of which hangs the outcome of a great 
contest for influence in Asia.’1 Indeed, the rivalry extends well beyond maritime issues, and 
Southeast Asian states have been drawn into this contest, whether or not they have disputes 
with China in the South China Sea. What led to this strategic turn, how the maritime disputes 
might develop, and the diplomacy required to negotiate the tensions and determine the future 
of regional institutions, are matters of some complexity. Close proximity to events and issues 
can lead to premature conclusions. There has, therefore, to be a certain level of circumspection 
in any commentary on the new geopolitics of the region. Nevertheless, any analysis of this 
situation must project future trends and outcomes, even as contemporary events are weighed 
against their long-term strategic significance.
STRATEGIC CONTEST
Not all is new in the ‘new’ geopolitics of Southeast Asia. What is new is the priority the United States 
has declared it is now giving to the region. This follows a period of relative neglect since the end of 
the Vietnam War, and the more recent American focus on Afghanistan and Iraq, even if there was an 
engagement with Southeast Asia in the aftermath of 9/11. Since the United States’ departure from 
Indochina, and especially in the last two decades, China’s economic rise has seen the depth and breadth 
of its influence in Southeast Asia, and indeed the world, increase. At the same time, American security 
and military preoccupations in the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as the financial and economic 
crisis since 2008, have caused its regional role to diminish. A new strategic reality has therefore been 
evolving in SoutheastAsia, driven by China’s economic rise against a background of the US’ foreign policy 
adventurism and its relative economic decline. 
 
 
 
 
1  Foreword in Munir Majid, 9/11 and the Attack on Muslims, Kuala Lumpur, MPH Publishing, 2012. For a useful American perspective on the rivalry 
see Aaron L Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy, New York, W.W. Norton, 2011. Arne Westad has recently published a magisterial work on the modern 
foundations of China’s view of the outside world: see Arne Westad, Restless Empire, China and the World since 1750, New York, Basic Books, 2012. 
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The Obama administration has decided to attempt to arrest this regional strategic drift with a strategic ‘pivot’ 
towards the Asia-Pacific. The US protests it has always been an Asia-Pacific power, but it had been a while since 
it acted like it, at least insofar as Southeast Asia was concerned.2 Now it has done so through clear strategic 
policy pronouncement and diplomatic manoeuvring. There is a new contest for influence in Southeast Asia.
The pivot is taking place in the context of deepening Chinese regional relationships. China’s economic rise 
and success not only won the admiration of Southeast Asian countries, but also helped Beijing establish 
strong trade and financial ties with them. China is now the second largest economy in the world (figure 1), 
with economic growth of about 9-10 percent per annum since the late 1970s, even as the American share 
of global GDP declined since 1999. The size of the Chinese economy is expected to surpass that of the US 
by 2030. As of 2005, China had lifted over 600 million people out of a dollar-a-day poverty. It is the world’s 
largest exporter and will probably be the biggest importer as well in the not too distant future. It is the world’s 
largest holder of foreign exchange reserves. It has become the world’s biggest creditor, lending more to the 
developing world than the World Bank. China’s economic and financial might has particularly been felt in 
Southeast Asia as that of the United States receded, especially since the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, when 
with the United States conspicuous by its inaction, China’s refusal to devalue the renminbi (RMB) was of great 
help to struggling Southeast Asian economies. Beijing’s economic diplomacy since then has been deft and 
effective. The China-ASEAN dialogue process had started with the Senior Officials Consultation meeting in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked during a visit to Malaysia in November 2010: ‘Since day one of the administration, Obama and I have made 
it a priority to re-engage with Asia-Pacific as we know that much of the history of the 21st century will be written in this region because it is the centre of so many 
of the world’s biggest opportunities and challenges.’ Secretary Clinton fully developed the point, America’s Pacific Century in Foreign Policy, November 2011.
Figure 1:  GDP Current Prices (in billions of US dollars) 2011 
Source: World Economic Outlook Database, IMF
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Figure 2:
China and US Direct investment in ASEAN (US million dollars) 2007-2010
1995, and in the wake of Asian financial crisis, China, 
along with Japan and South Korea, accepted ASEAN’s 
invitation to attend an informal summit in Kuala 
Lumpur in 1997, which evolved into ASEAN+3 (APT). 
By October 2003, China had acceded to ASEAN’s 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The China-
ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) came into effect in 
January 2010. 
Regional economic integration in East Asia as a whole 
has proceeded apace. Intra-regional exports have 
been growing in the past decade from 34 percent 
in 2002 to over 50 percent in the ASEAN+3 region 
(figure 2). The rest of the region is riding on China, 
even if the final products are still destined for the 
huge consumer markets of the US and Europe. 
Since 1993 China has been a net importer in regional 
trade. About 50 percent of China’s component imports 
are from Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. In terms of 
FDI, Japan has over 30,000 companies investing over 
$60 billion in China; South Korea also over 30,000 
investing more than $35 billion; Singapore is involved 
in over 16,000 projects with investments of over $31 
billion. Even Taiwan, with whom China has a non-
negotiable ‘core interest’ problem, has over $110 
billion invested on the mainland, and just in August 
this year signed an investor-protection agreement 
Direction of ASEAN Imports and Exports (China vs US)
Source:  ASEAN Statistics Yearbook, China Daily, Office of the United States Trade Representative
Source:  ASEAN Statistics Database
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with Beijing (Taiwanese firms are responsible for 60 percent of China’s hardware exports). Furthermore, 
multinational companies  account for 60 percent of China’s total trade, and 80 percent of the value of their 
exports is imported. Indeed, about 60 percent of all imports into the US emanate from US subsidiaries or sub-
contracted firms operating in China. What these figures show is that it is not simply ‘Chinese’ exports that 
determine the geoeconomic terrain of the region. Instead, China is at the centre of regional and international 
division of labour. 
Moreover, all the surpluses are recycled. Paul Krugman calls China a ‘T-bills republic’, such is its integration 
in the global and regional economy. During the Western financial and economic crisis of 2008, China 
pulled its weight with a RMB4 trillion ($586 billion) stimulus package. East and Southeast Asian countries 
were better able to contend with the 2008 crisis not only because of the improvements they had made in 
corporate governance, foreign exchange reserves, bank capitalisation and regulation since the Asian crisis of 
1997-98, but also because of China’s emergence as a key driver of economic growth.3 Following the Asian 
crisis, China had been instrumental in the setting up of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) 
to support economies in the ASEAN+3 region facing short-term liquidity problems with a pool of foreign 
exchange reserves presently standing at $240 billion. A regional office based in Singapore has been set up 
to conduct the kind of macro-economic surveillance the IMF does, with the CMIM standing ready to give 
financial support of up to two years based on agreed covenants. China’s economic rise, while enabled by the 
US-led open global financial and economic system, has also been achieved by doing the right economic and 
financial things together with regional states. As a result, seven Asian economies have been identified as the 
future engines of global growth, with the growth in the emerging middle class being a key driver (figure 3).
3  Morgan Stanley report, 6 November 2008.
 
 
Country 
2010 
GDP  
(MER 
trillion)
2050  
GDP  
(MER 
trillion)
PRC 5.7 62.9
India 1.4 40.4
Indonesia        0.7 11.4
Japan 5.4 8.2
Republic 
of Korea
1.0 3.7
Thailand 0.3 3.2
Malaysia 0.2 2.6
Total  
Asia -7  
14.8 132.4
 
Source:  IMF World Economic Outlook,  
Oct 2010; Centennial Group 
Projections 2011
 2030 2050
Country Middle 
class
Upper 
class
GDP 
per 
capita 
(PPP)
Middle 
class
Upper 
class
GDP per 
capita 
(PPP)
PRC 1,120 40 21,100 1240 190 47,800
India 1,190 15 13,200 1400 210 41,700
Indonesia 220 5 13,500 250 40 37,400
Japan 100 20 48,900 60 40 66,700
Republic 
of Korea
30 20 60,200 10 35 107,600
Vietnam 80 2 11,900 100 15 33,800
World  4,990 580 19,400 5,900 1,500 36,600
US 185 190 65,500 120 290 98,600
Germany 50 30 51,300 2 60 77,800
 
Source: Centennial Group Projections 2011
Engines of Growth  (Asia-7 Economies) 
Between 2010 and 2050, they will account  
for 87 percent of total GDP growth in Asia 
and almost 55 percent of global GDP growth. 
They will thus be the engines of not only 
Asia’s economy but also the global economy.
The Emerging Middle Class is a Key Driver  
The middle class is the source of savings and entrepreneurship 
that drives new products and processes. Growth comes mainly 
from new products and most growth happens when new products 
are targeted at the middle class.  Consumption by the global 
middle class accounts for one-third of total global demand.
Figure 3:  Engines and Drivers of Growth  
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Figure 5:  China VS US Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN
Source: ASEAN Statistics Yearbook, China Daily, Office of the Unites States Trade Representative
US Direct Investment 
Position Abroad on a 
Historical-Cost Basis  
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Impressive though such numbers and trends are, they only represent the foundation of a future prospect, a 
work-in-progress. While the story of China’s and Asia’s economic rise is absorbing, coming as it does at a time 
of relative American economic decline, it is important to avoid the temptation to treat future projections as 
current reality. The United States’ economy is still by far the largest and most sophisticated single economy in 
the world. It is a substantial market for ASEAN, and US investment in the region is still substantially greater than 
China’s (see figure 4). The United States also retains significant technological superiority, as well as structural 
advantages including the reserve currency role of the US dollar, that together mean that the US has greater 
capacity to extract itself from its economic problems than any other nation in the world.4 Moreover, China’s 
massive holdings of dollar-denominated assets are a double-edged sword, described by some as ‘symmetrical’ 
interdependence.5 Finally, of course, the US has a military force without equal, ensuring American command 
of the global commons. In 2011 the US spent over eight times more on defence than China, its nearest 
competitor (see figure 5). The $739.3 billion Pentagon budget comfortably exceeded the $486.4 billion of 
the next nine powers, of whom only two could be remotely conceived as ‘hostile’ – China and Russia.
In the past couple of years or so, the US government has been less reticent about being seen to be promoting 
US trade, investment and technology in Southeast Asia. At the end of 2010 Hillary Clinton, while on an official 
visit to Malaysia, found time to showcase the cutting-edge technology of GE and Boeing. The US-ASEAN 
Business Council, which shadowed her visit, was represented at a much higher level than has usually been 
the case. In July 2012, the US Secretary of State spoke in Siem Reap at the end of a business promotion 
seminar jointly organised by the Council, the US Treasury and the Department of State. This concentrated 
US effort, not often seen in Southeast Asia, let alone in Cambodia, Beijing’s close ally, came just after the 
Phnom Penh ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting that failed to agree to a joint communique for the first time 
in its history because of differences over how to mention incidents in the South China Sea disputes. Apart 
from strong US government involvement, what stood out was a willingness to be politically agnostic in 
the furtherance of strategic economic interest. The next morning the US business delegation continued to 
Myanmar, accompanied by senior officials from the US Treasury. In these and other diplomatic endeavours, 
there is a desire to signal a strong economic dimension to the pivot distinct from the security and military 
concerns that have dominated the headlines.
However, there are shortcomings in what the US is offering. Leaving aside the administration’s domestic 
economic and political difficulties, its proposed economic arrangements in East and Southeast Asia, in contrast 
to China’s, are distinguished by their failure to be inclusive. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative, apart 
from excluding China, also leaves out Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, whilst including Vietnam and welcoming 
all other Southeast Asian states. Whatever the curious criteria for membership that is being applied here, it 
encourages regional division. The American insistence on rules-based economic integration or engagement 
has also slowed progress in forging free trade agreements (FTAs), for example one with Malaysia which has 
been stalled for some time over issues like procurement rules and freedom of investment. Although the Obama 
administration now appears to want to concentrate on the TPP rather than individual FTAs, the coupling of 
political and human rights issues with US trade and investment causes resentment and uncertainty among 
many regional states. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4  See Carla Norrlof, America’s global advantage : US hegemony and international cooperation, Cambridge University Press (2010).
5  See, for instance, Joseph S. Nye, Jr, ‘China’s Bad Bet Against America,’ PacNet Newsletter, March 25, 2010
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All this is in sharp contrast with the way in which China conducts its relations with the region without apparent 
precondition.6 Whatever the US’s domestic legal and policy predisposition, it will have to bring to the table a 
package of economic benefits that is not compromised by high political costs. Of course there are American 
technologies and corporations without equal in the world which could tip the balance, but there are also 
proximate companies emerging from China such as Huawei and Lenovo; just as Sony, Toyota and Samsung 
emerged in the past. The region has moved on from the time when American technologies and corporations 
were singularly dominant. 
As with its economy, companies and technologies, the United States as a global political power no longer 
exercises sole dominion in Southeast Asia. China’s economic counterweight has shifted the scales. However, 
the US is not waiting to be reduced to sub-primacy in the region as a result of what some have dubbed 
Chinese ‘domination by stealth’. While singular but hugely significant events such as China’s increasingly 
assertive approach in the South China Sea disputes may appear to have reignited US involvement in the 
region, there is a broader ‘rebalancing’ strategy to register American power and influence, and to thwart a 
de facto Chinese Monroe Doctrine over Southeast Asia. 
However, the diplomacy of rebalancing faces a number of challenges. The US is not ‘returning’ to ‘virgin’ 
Southeast Asian territory. In recent decades the region has been transformed by a focus on economic 
development, and if the US wants to engage the region it has to recognise this, and rather than seek to dislodge 
any party instead strive to enjoy combined prosperity. Of course the region, including China, developed on 
the back of American markets, but this is global interdependence, from which American corporations and 
consumers also benefited. It is not a debt owed by anyone. The Americans understandably wish to benefit from 
the projected Asia-Pacific growth in the future, but participation has to be on an inclusive basis if autarchic 
arrangements or trade wars are not to develop which will stunt that prosperity. For a start, an inclusive 
TPP which includes China would show economic good faith. This would have far-reaching geoeconomic 
ramifications and will undercut exclusively East Asian arrangements favoured by China. Beneath the super-
structure of evident strategic contest there is a deep unresolved conflict of ideas over economic and political 
order. When Francis Fukuyama wrote about the end of history he did not ask the East Asians.7 There is a 
nascent East Asian, largely state-based, model of development that offers an alternative to the American 
neoliberal model Fukuyama prematurely proclaimed triumphant with the demise of the Soviet Union. The 
weaknesses of the Western model highlighted in the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession – 
financial market excesses, over-consumption, under-saving and massive private and public deficits – are part 
of the contemporary economic landscape, and for it to retain its appeal demonstrable repair to correct the 
damage done is needed. While the ‘Chinese’ model is by no means fully formed and, indeed, has serious 
weaknesses, the United States should not expect to just gloss over the evident shortcomings of the Washington 
Consensus and the economies based on it. 
On the political side, while the pivot is essentially diplomatic in nature, its execution cannot be comprised purely 
of diplomacy. The catalyst for the pivot was a situation not only of reduced American regional influence but 
also of more assertive Chinese actions, especially in the South China Sea. When Hillary Clinton proclaimed at 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010 that the US had an interest in freedom of navigation 
and the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea, she did so with the encouragement of 
regional states at the meeting, and not in a benign context. This is often noted as the first real instance of 
American re-engagement in the region. China was put on notice and indeed, at that meeting, indicated it did 
 
6  Interestingly, a trilateral FTA, as well as an investment promotion agreement, will be negotiated later this year among China, Japan and South Korea 
(constituting altogether around 20 percent of global GDP) despite tensions with one another. Such pragmatism will make possible the third largest FTA in the 
world after NAFTA and the EU. With the three countries also having FTAs with ASEAN, this could reinforce an ASEAN-led East Asian multilateral structure – while, 
of course, the Americans would want an Asia-Pacific dimension so as not to be excluded. The three countries (including Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao) account 
for 90 percent of East Asia’s total GDP and over 90 percent of its foreign reserves.
7  Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1992.
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not appreciate being cornered. Whilst by the time of the East Asia Summit (EAS) meeting in Bali in November 
2011, at which the US (and Russia) became members, the temperature had cooled down, there continued 
to be pressure on China about its actions and intentions in the South China Sea. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
handled the situation better than Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi did in Hanoi, soothingly noting comments on 
the disputes but repeating the Chinese mantra that they are best resolved bilaterally even if there might be 
regional concern, and swiftly proceeded to underline, in some detail, that the greatest challenge facing the 
region was economic. He referred consistently to ‘East Asia’ (as opposed to the Asia-Pacific), and emphasised 
how the region should be thinking about addressing the global economic problems facing it.
The United States, on the other hand, was more focused on political, security and military issues, and did 
not offer any guidance to the region on how the global economic problems could be addressed. Wen 
Jiabao’s sub-text might well have been: the United States is the primary villain for the world’s financial and 
economic problems, and is too busy grappling with its own to offer any leads to the region to which it has 
now come back. Of course, this reopens the whole argument over who is responsible for the global financial 
and economic crisis, a debate in which China and the region speak with one voice, emphasising the United 
States’ mismanagement of the financial system and the unsustainable imbalances of Western economies that 
through public and private leverage have consumed more than they have produced for too long. Southeast 
Asia’s conviction that economic discipline needs to be restored in the West, and in particular, that the United 
States’ indebtedness needs to be reined in, highlights the intermingling of the economic with the political 
and security arguments, a feature of the regional strategic contest which the US cannot avoid and that China 
will always stress. Still, even from the purely political and security perspective, there will be questions asked 
about America’s new commitment to the region, some founded, again, on economic sustainability. Many 
realists point to the risk of strategic over-stretch.8 Even as the US’s commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan end, 
it does not mean the pivot in the Asia-Pacific is intended to take up the slack – there is no slack at this time 
of austerity. And what exactly does the pivot mean in wider security terms and in respect of its application in 
particular situations? While the US can ‘rebalance’ its naval forces, for what exactly is that formidable military 
power intended, either as a deterrent or in conflict? From Hillary Clinton’s forceful statement at the ARF in 
Hanoi, it would appear that the US will use naval force to ensure there is no interference with shipping and 
navigation on the high seas. However, despite the many incidents in the South China Sea, it has not been 
deemed that there has been interference requiring such intervention. In the episodes this year involving China 
against Vietnam and the Philippines, Manila in particular had hoped to draw in the US in the Scarborough 
Shoal standoff, but found that from an American perspective the incident did not amount to interference 
with navigation, and that the US did not regard localised incidents as attempts at settlement by forceful 
means. The state of flux in the South China Sea thus reflects the ambiguous finer details of the pivot, and 
raises the question of how seriously regional states should take the United States’ commitment to project 
military power in support of its declared principles.
This in turn raises a deeper question of credibility and constancy of policy. While it is clear that the US intends 
to be actively involved in Southeast Asia once again, confirmed by its membership of the EAS in November 
last year, it remains to be seen how deeply and enduring that involvement will be. Naval arrangements are 
being introduced, revived or improved, including with the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, which 
reflect the credibility of American presence. However, in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, the US’s concerned 
but cautious approach to the Arab uprisings and its delicate handling of the Iranian nuclear issue mean that 
China will be watching to assess America’s approach to its use of military power – as will the rest of Southeast 
Asia. For those regional states, the handling of the South China Sea is likely to be the critical measure. The 
concern is China might miscalculate if there are not clear lines of mutual understanding with the US beyond 
 
8  For a recent illuminating discussion on the limits of contemporary American power see Dana Allin and Erik Jones, Weary Policeman, American Power in an 
Age of Austerity, Routledge for International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2012.
29
the last incident. On the other hand, while it can be expected the US will decide for itself the balance of risk 
and benefit from the use of military power, it must do so in a way that avoids either wishful thinking about 
the nature of an adversary or a self-fulfilling panic about that adversary’s intentions and capabilities.9 
Such detached analysis is not currently evident in the US, which exhibits a disturbing sense of suspicion and 
fear of China across all fronts. During a visit to Washington in May this year, I found influential Senators and 
think-tanks uniform in their view China could not be trusted and was getting out of hand. This constituency 
feels vindicated in that assessment by Beijing’s claims and recent actions in the South China Sea. High 
officials in the State department were more circumspect, and wanted to know how the US could work 
better with states in the region, including in addressing the South China Sea problems. The US could make 
a real contribution by taking the approach that the deep seabed was the common heritage of mankind and 
fashioning American involvement in these issues on this basis, rather than simply repeating the mantra of 
freedom of the seas and peaceful settlement of disputes.10 Without under-estimating its complexity or the 
political barriers involved, any engagement of the US along these lines could be a crucial step in winning 
over Southeast Asian States and, indeed, enlisting Beijing in a positive-sum game. However, the way relations 
between China and US are developing does not give much hope that creative engagement, especially in the 
strategic contest in Southeast Asia, will achieve much. Yet the animosity between American and Chinese 
elites will have to be addressed once the next Obama  administration is in place  and China’s new leaders to 
be confirmed on 8 November find their feet. 
Even then, domestic politics in both countries are not likely to allow easy accommodation. There is extreme 
polarisation in the US, which may also have foreign policy expression.  President Obama’s  re-election still 
leaves unresolved the political paralysis in government between Congress and the White House . Whilst the 
President has wide-ranging perogatives in foreign policy, the China question has deep domestic implications. 
A tough stance against Beijing could become an attractive trade-off for Congressional budgetary concessions, 
particularly if there is short-term economic benefit to be gained from that stance as well. A second term 
President Obama may surprise, but there will be domestic policy dues to pay, which may in the end bring 
out the pragmatist in him.  There could be a ‘tough’ stance against China. In that eventuality, the pivot could 
become a hardball engagement in Southeast Asia, concentrated on the seas of North East and Southeast Asia. 
Regional states may be driven into making a choice between the US and China, something which they hope 
and imagine they can avoid. The impact of internal politics on China’s foreign policy is also not to be under-
estimated. This is not only because of the purge of Bo Xilai or the coming change in the senior leadership of 
the Party. There is increasingly greater expression of popular views which can be channelled towards issues 
of foreign policy, especially where historical grievance animates nationalism, such as in the current relations 
with Japan. In addition, Chinese perceptions of their rise – as the second largest economy in the world on 
which the US depends for credit – can give rise to hubris. Internal politics, if it isn’t already doing so, may 
therefore exert pressures on the Chinese leadership to prematurely show strength in international relations.
It is often said China prefers the clarity of Republican foreign policy to the nuance of the Democrats. This is 
of course an over-simplification. Henry Kissinger records Deng Xiaoping complaining of how he and President 
Nixon were not hindered by the savage Cultural Revolution from forging relations with China in the early 
1970s, yet under George Bush snr the Tiananmen massacre became such an American bone of contention 
with China.11 What made the difference was the impetus to seize the strategic moment – in Nixon’s case 
the opportunity for strategic alignment with Beijing following the Sino-Soviet split. A  tough stance against 
China  could bring clarity to the hard strategic contest in Southeast Asia, and in doing so cause China’s 
9  This is the ‘duality’ of George Kennan’s wisdom, in a different context of course, quoted in Allin and Jones, op. cit., pp.104-5.
10  The common heritage of mankind idea was one of the main issues that prolonged negotiations before the conclusion of the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. It is this notion, expressed in the establishment of the International Deep Seabed Authority, which prevents the US Congress from 
ratifying the convention. For a passionate espousal of this idea see C.W. Jenks, Law, Freedom and Welfare, London, Stevens and Sons, 1963.
11  Henry Kissinger, On China, London, Penguin Books, 2012, p.425
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peaceful rise to come off the rails. This would be bad news not just for China, but for Southeast Asia as a 
whole, with the region’s hitherto economy-first-security-afterwards approach to international politics being 
sharply reversed. China’s new leaders may struggle to deal with severe international and internal challenges 
being cast at the same time. The racy aspects of the Bo Xilai affair have been widely commented on, but the 
underlying and incremental loss of trust in how the country is being governed which it highlights has yet to 
be fully appreciated.12 Combined with a slowing economy, rising unemployment and distributional issues, 
China’s new leaders will be facing foreign policy challenges at a time of domestic distress, which does not 
make for stable external relations. Already, China has made some impulsive moves in the disputes in the 
South China Sea, and in its island disputes in northeast Asia. It has not quite thrown down the gauntlet, but 
conflict in the South China Sea has become the first serious test in the strategic contest between China and 
the US in Southeast Asia.
STORMY SOUTH CHINA SEA
For much of this year hardly a day has passed without a report or commentary on issues and incidents in the 
South China Sea. Not since the Vietnam War has there been this level of foreign interest in Southeast Asia. 
Yet for regional states the disputes in the South China Sea have existed for many years, always with the 
hope that the disputes will not escalate into conflict, as countries in the region concentrated on economic 
development and cooperation, including with China, with whom four of them have maritime disputes (see 
figure 6). Even when there had been serious outbreaks of conflict, as in a naval battle in the Paracels between 
China and the then South Vietnam in 1974, or in 1988, when over 70 Vietnamese were killed in a naval battle 
with the Chinese in the Spratlys, there followed an attempt to carry on with peaceful regional life even as 
those disputes were not resolved and memories of conflict not erased. ASEAN countries and China signed 
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, and the regional organisation 
has been working for over ten years without success on a more specific code of conduct to govern maritime 
activity in the disputed waters. As ASEAN worked in good faith to produce those governing documents it 
was hoped that the states involved would avoid misconduct; what is sometimes seen as muddling through 
is rather the way ASEAN has tended to work so as not to ruffle too many feathers. This ASEAN way – the 
slow motion effectuation of functional integration – has worked in promoting economic cooperation, even 
if not at the pace many would have liked, and in limiting conflict in the region in the last couple of decades 
or so. 13 But, almost suddenly, everything changed with the series of incidents in the South China Sea and 
premature proclamations of sovereignty, precisely the kinds of crises the muddling-through-to-functional-
integration approach sought to avoid. The ASEAN approach of papering over cracks was a casualty when 
its Foreign Ministers met in Phnom Penh in July this year, but were unable to issue a joint communique for 
the first time in the organisation’s 45-year history because of differences over how to word references to the 
South China Sea disputes and recent incidents. 
What brought about this more impulsive and intransigent behaviour, both on the high seas and at the 
ASEAN council tables? China claims the American pivot and interference in the regional maritime disputes 
have encouraged claimant states to be more assertive. The two states cited – the Philippines and Vietnam 
– counterclaim that the Chinese vessels, both civilian and military, have become increasingly bullying at sea. 
The US continues to assert that it will not tolerate any interference with freedom of navigation and, whilst 
refusing to take sides in the disputes over rights and sovereignty of the islands, rocks and waters, to urge a 
peaceful settlement. Domestic constituencies, America’s included, are becoming ever more agitated, as after 
 
12  See, for instance, Lanxin Xiang, ‘The Bo Xilai Affair and China’s Future’, Survival, June-July 2012, pp. 59-68.
13  See generally the Special collection of papers on ASEAN in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 22, Number 3, September 2009 where, 
among other points, it is asked if the ‘ASEAN way’ is receding and whether ASEAN is just the vehicle for conflict avoidance rather than resolution.
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Figure 6:  South China Sea Claims
Source:  Voice of America   
http://blogs.voanews.com/state-department-news/2012/08/15/china-bashes-western-meddling-over-south-china-sea/
each incident reports highlight the untold hydrocarbon 
wealth in the seabed (for example, 213 billion barrels 
of unproven oil reserves, against the 265 billion barrels 
of proven reserves held by Saudi Arabia in 2011, 
according to BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy), 
as well as rich but fast depleting fisheries resources 
in their waters.
Internationally, China is often identified as the villain of 
the piece. This of course riles the Chinese when they 
believe they have absolute right on their side. China 
argues its claim to sovereignty, exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) and continental shelf rights in most of 
the South China Sea can be traced back 2,000 years 
to the Han dynasty. China says it can provide proof 
from the 13th century and, further, that in 1935 it 
published the full names of the 132 islands or so 
(unsurprisingly estimates of the numbers involved 
vary based on claims and definitions which are not 
clear) in the South China Sea, including Huangyan 
Island (also known as Scarborough Shoal, where there 
was a stand-off with the Philippines this year). China 
points out that its vessels have long been fishing 
as well as conducting scientific exploration, radio 
communications and sea traffic in the area, and that 
official recorded statements by the Chinese leadership 
reaffirm China’s control of the territories. This historical 
basis for its claims notwithstanding, Beijing points out 
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that Article 2 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of 1992 
includes all the claimed islands and was not disputed by any country at the time (including the Philippines). 
According to the Chinese, the Philippines only started making public claims after mid-1997, culminating in 
the amendment of the Philippines Territorial Sea Baseline Act in 2009 – before then, official maps of the 
Philippines all marked Huangyan Island as outside Philippines territory. The Philippines, in contrast, contend 
that from 1734 colonial maps showed Scarborough Shoal as part of its territory. Beijing counterclaims that 
the 1734 maps were drawn by a missionary and were not official, whereas China had itself produced an 
official map in 1279 which shows that it discovered Huangyan Island.
All very substantive. Indeed, from the Chinese point of view, formidable in respect of its wider South China 
Sea claim and especially in regard to Scarborough Shoal. If so, the Philippines has responded, why not take 
the matter to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea established by the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to which both countries are parties, or to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
knowing full well China had always ruled this out. Some contend the Philippines is seeking to score a moral 
point, others that it is willing to take a chance as it has little to lose. State attitudes to the settlement of 
international disputes by judicial means or arbitration is a vexed matter not amenable to easy generalisation.14 
Nevertheless, the greater the expanse of territory involved the less likely states are to subject its status to 
judicial determination, and major powers have been averse to any kind of reduction of their super-sovereignty 
on most matters, let alone one relating to territorial extent. China, of course, is in the good company of the 
United States in this, and its stance on judicial arbitration will not change. It would be better to recognise 
this reality and to find other ways to resolve the disputes peacefully.
Trying to do so without antagonising one party or another is particularly difficult given the bewildering 
number of claims and the wealth of resources at stake. The Philippines has not always been consistent in the 
pursuit of its claims. Between 2003 and 2005, it broke ranks with ASEAN and signed a number of energy 
cooperation agreements with China. PETROVIETNAM, Vietnam’s Oil and Gas Corporation,  also signed the 
agreement in 2005 for joint marine seismic survey in certain areas of the South China Sea with the Philippine 
National Oil Company (PNOC) and the China National Offshore Corporation (CNOOC). In it the Philippines 
‘made breath-taking concessions in agreeing to the area for study, including parts of its own continental 
shelf not even claimed by China or Vietnam. Through its actions, Manila has given a certain legitimacy to 
China’s legally spurious ‘historic claim’ to most of the South China Sea.’15 This agreement was allowed to 
lapse by the Arroyo administration when it expired at the end of June 2008, following allegations of kickbacks 
and corruption. Before the amendment to the Territorial Sea Baseline Act in 2009, debate in the Philippines 
was divided between the Senate and the House of Representatives, with the former choosing to define the 
Spratlys only as a ‘regime of islands’ outside the baselines and the latter expressly including Scarborough 
Shoal and the Spratlys within the country’s territorial baselines. The Senate’s version was passed in February 
2008 – before the 2009 amendment reversed this position. 
Since June 2010, the Aquino administration has taken a firmer stand in furtherance of Filipino claims. It 
is difficult to say if the Philippines has been encouraged by Hillary Clinton’s notice of American interest in 
the South China Sea, but there have been indications of a willingness to assert Philippine interest. In April 
2012, a two-month stand-off ensued in Scarborough Shoal when a Philippine warship tried unsuccessfully 
to apprehend eight Chinese vessels ‘caught’ fishing in disputed waters. The incident showed a number of 
Filipino dilemmas in the defence of its claims, with its desire to take action restricted by a lack of military 
capability and an economic dependence on China for trade and tourism. The Philippines has also sought to 
engage the US, but has been unable to draw either the State Department or the Navy into particular dispute 
14  See Munir Majid, Asian and African Attitudes to the Settlement of International Disputes by Judicial Means, unpublished PhD thesis, Department of 
International Relations, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1978
15  Barry Wain, Manila’s Bungle in the South China Sea, Far Eastern Economic Review, January/February 2008.
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situations; whilst the US expressed robust official support during President Aquino’s Washington visit in June 
this year, there was no specific commitment to any particular South China Sea situation. The Philippines has 
also sought full ASEAN support, but at the same time not been averse to going-it-alone, and appealed to 
international law, but only when serving national interests. It might be time for the Philippines to pull itself 
together and reflect more deeply on a truly regional approach to the solution of the issues involved.
Vietnam has had even more difficulty confronting China’s claims. Two out of three sets of territorial issues – the 
land border and delineation of the Gulf of Tonkin – have been largely resolved. The outstanding South China 
Sea overlapping sovereignty claims, particularly the Paracels and the Spratlys, put Vietnam in an unenviable 
position vis-à-vis China. Hanoi sees its new naval association with the US as a help, but keeps this arrangement 
limited, reluctant put all its eggs in one basket.16 Vietnam also looks to Japan, South Korea and Australia for 
‘support’, as well as to India and Russia. In September last year Hanoi signed an agreement with New Delhi 
to jointly explore in disputed waters, and the following month entered into a memorandum of understanding 
on defence cooperation enhancement, and has also been trying to entice Russia into oil and gas exploration. 
Clearly, the idea is to increase the number of nations with a stake in a peaceful Southeast Asia. 
Vietnam has an advantage in having the opportunity to soothe relations with China through communist party-
to-party fratricidal discussions, but has the greater disadvantage of having the most number of conflicting 
claims in the South China Sea with Beijing – framed by a thousand year history of conflict. Bilateral relations 
over the dispute have been bad, with accusations, skirmishes and threats. They have been exacerbated by 
Vietnam’s agreement to allow oil exploration by international energy companies, Chinese attacks on Vietnamese 
fishing boats, Beijing’s plans for tourist cruises in the disputed Paracels and military exercises in the region, and 
demonstrations and protests in Vietnam against China’s ‘hegemonic ambitions’. In January 2008 the China-
Vietnam Steering Committee met in Beijing in an attempt to calm things down following the Chinese decision 
to create an administrative centre on Hainan for the Spratlys, Paracels and Macclesfield Bank in December 
2007. This initiative failed, and in June this year Vietnam passed a law claiming sovereignty over the Paracels 
and Spratlys, as China raised Sansha City in the Paracels to prefecture level and 45 legislators were elected 
in July to govern the 1,100 Chinese people in the claimed areas, covering 772,000 square miles of the South 
China Sea.17 To underline all this, later in July China’s Central Military Commission approved deployment of 
two military garrisons – one army, the other navy – to guard the disputed islands. 
The deployment caused the US State department to issue a statement of concern over the escalation, obtaining 
in return China’s rejoinder that the Americans had no right to interfere in a matter of its sovereign jurisdiction. 
For good measure, the US Deputy Chief of Mission in Beijing was summoned to the foreign ministry. China feels 
its actions are unjustly selected out for criticism while the provocative activities of other claimants, particularly 
the Philippines and Vietnam, are glossed over or ignored. China has thus become less tolerant of criticism 
and more insistent on its sovereign rights. Chinese state-controlled newspapers have been particularly shrill in 
their insistence on China’s freedom of action. The China Daily, in a commentary on 30 July this year, accused 
the US of double standards and reflected it was ‘Better [for China] to be safe than sorry… [and] to safeguard 
its sovereignty and territorial integrity.’ More broadly, it was of the view that the United States’ strategic shift 
is intended to contain China. ‘The current security environment for Beijing is the most complex and severe 
since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China’, an assessment that led it to conclude that, with 
respect to safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, no country would renounce the use of 
force. Alongside such thinly-veiled official warnings is a concentration of opinion calling for China to take a 
more aggressive stance, including from maritime agency chiefs, PLA officers and military advisers. An official 
16  During a discussion with the LSE Asia Research Centre on 8th November 2011, a delegation from Vietnam which included government officials contended 
that while ASEAN talks and talks, China talks and takes. There was a wish for unilateral declarations of interest on issues in the South China Sea, for example by 
the UK. A multi-layered approach was preferred from ASEAN to EAS to the wider international community.
17  China wrested de facto control of the Paracels following the naval showdown in 1974 when (then South) Vietnam withdrew. A 2,700 meter long runway 
was completed in Sansha city in 1990. Beijing claims to have established an administrative apparatus to manage its claimed islands since 1959.
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with China Marine Surveillance argues that ‘China 
now faces a whole pack of aggressive neighbours 
headed by Vietnam and the Philippines and also a set 
of menacing challengers headed by the United States, 
forming their encirclement from outside the region.’ 
Responding to developments in July, Major General 
Zhu Chenghu, who once urged the use of nuclear 
weapons if American forces intervened in a conflict 
over Taiwan, accused the US of ‘meddling’ and said it 
was ‘unreasonable and illegal’ for the Philippines and 
Vietnam to claim territory that historically belonged 
to China, claiming that there had been no disputes 
in the South China Sea until the discovery of large 
amounts of gas and oil reserves in the 1970s. Cui Liru, 
President of the China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations, a Beijing think-tank closely 
linked to China’s intelligence services, has also been 
urging a tough stance. At the World Peace Forum in 
Beijing in June he argued that China needed to do 
more in terms of demonstrating its sovereignty. Others 
at the forum voiced the view that China’s patience had 
been tested to its limits and there was no room for 
further tolerance. Such official views are reflected on 
the ground, where formerly Hainan-based fishermen 
now in Sansha City ask why China should tolerate 
challenges to its sovereignty now that it is so strong. 
The situation in the South China Sea has deteriorated 
precipitously. From the latter half of 2011 until early 
2012, it was characterised by a more moderate 
approach from the Chinese, and a focus on 
diplomatic engagement, investment and trade with 
neighbouring countries. This came to an abrupt end 
with the Scarborough stand-off, and China has instead 
become both assertive and reactive. Whether or not 
Scarborough was a miscalculation by the Philippines, it 
is now used by China to defend its claims to a domestic 
audience. US Secretary of Defence Panetta’s historic 
Cam Ranh Bay visit in June and the Vietnamese law 
of the sea passed that same month, similarly allowed 
China to claim encouragement and abetment by the 
US. China has rapidly come to view the disputes as a 
tool being used by the Americans to contain China, 
just as the US becomes more engaged in the region 
through the pivot. Nonetheless, China is once again 
making peaceable gestures with respect to the South 
China Sea issues. In September Xi Jinping, the soon-
to-be-appointed Chinese leader, gave the assurance to 
ASEAN leaders at a trade fair in Nanning that China 
wishes to solve the disputes peacefully. At the ASEAN 
Maritime Forum in Manila in October, China once 
again offered a grant for maritime cooperation in the 
South China Sea. It remains to be seen whether such 
gestures reflect a substantive softening of the Chinese 
position or merely the ebb and flow of diplomatic 
manouvering. What is surer is that states with a stake 
in the South China Sea do not want to be fully exposed 
to the caprice of the Chinese.
China’s actions in its sea disputes have been bewildering 
and fraught with threat, and its threat and use of 
force have alarmed states in Southeast Asia. Such a 
belligerent foreign policy risks neutralising the goodwill 
Beijing has built in the region over almost two decades. 
While other South China Sea disputants, particularly 
the Philippines and Vietnam, are not exactly innocent, 
China has shown a disproportionate propensity to 
punish and to physically assert its sovereign claims 
in a manner that is disconcerting, and which frankly 
frightens regional states. 
In the complexity of causes that have conspired to 
incite China’s actions, its unsteady and erratic hand 
reveals a desire to be feared more than respected. 
Such a populist bellicose attitude cannot be allowed 
to rise to the level of official policy in a great power 
which claims to seek peaceable relations, even if as a 
hegemon. It is not just the threat or use of force that 
is a matter of concern. It is also the indifference to 
the interdependent economic good that such actions 
put at risk. 
The beneficiary of China’s strategic misjudgment will 
be the United States. The Chinese of course see the 
Americans as the cause of their discomfiture, but their 
inability to ride the US pivot towards Southeast Asia 
will ensure its success. If the Americans had intended 
to contain China in the rebalance in Asia-Pacific, they 
could not have asked for a better response than what 
Beijing has offered in the past of couple of years. 
Yet the strategic contest in the region is by no means 
settled. The US still has to manage its relations  with 
China, which extend far beyond the regional canvas. 
The dilemma the US cannot escape is how to integrate 
into the international system a rising power which 
will eat into American predominance in the world, 
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even if it will remain the preeminent power for a long 
time to come. The instinct to attempt to snuff out the 
rising power has to be resisted, even if such a strategy 
were possible. Washington has so far managed this 
well, in spite of the pressures of domestic opinion 
from both sides of the partisan divide. In Southeast 
Asia China has become economically preeminent, 
and whatever China’s strategic mis-steps over the 
South China Sea disputes, the United States will not 
displace China’s economic importance in the region. 
The test for the United States is to manage its relations 
with China in Southeast Asia as elsewhere without 
reflecting China’s self-righteousness with its own sense 
of exceptionalism. The US must show it has come back 
to Southeast Asia not to displace China but to be a 
counterweight and a force for the regional good.  ■
